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Abstract 
This paper examines the role of interest rate policy in a small open 
economy subject to terms of  trade shocks, and time-varying currency 
risks.  The private sector makes optimal decisions in an intertempo- 
ral non-linear setting with rational, forward-looking expectations. In 
contrast, the monetary  authority practices  "least-squares  learning" 
about the evolution of  inflation, output growth, and exchange rate 
depreciation in alternative policy scenarios. Interest rates are set by 
linear quadratic optimization, with the objectives for inflation, out- 
put  growth, or depreciation  depending on current  conditions.  The 
simulation results show that the prefered stance is one which targets 
inflation only.  Including other targets such as growth and exchange 
rate changes significantly increases output variability, and unambigu- 
ously decreases welfare. 
Key  words: Currency risks, learning, parameterized expectations, 
policy targets 
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This paper examines the role of  interest rate policy in a srnall open economy 
subject to terms of  trade shocks, and time-varying currency risks.  A central 
bank committed to low inflation controls neither the terms of  trade nor the 
evolution of  currency risk, both of  which condition the response of inflation 
to its policy  instruments.  In this  context, the best  the central  bank  can 
do is to "learn" the effects indirectly, by frequently "updating"  estimates of 
inflat  ion dynamics and "re-adj usting" its policy rules accordingly. 
Of course, central banks, even those with explicit inflation targets, adjust 
their policy stance from time to time to stimulate growth.  And when the 
exchange rate depreciates rapidly, due to adverse external shocks, it should 
not be surprising if  a central bank also comes under strong pressure to incor- 
porate exchange rate volatility targets in its policy objectives.  But, should 
growth and exchange rate changes be included as monetary policy targets? 
Much of  the discussion of  monetary policy is framed by the well-known 
Taylor (1993, 1999) rule, whereby interest rates respond to their own lag, as 
well  as to deviations of  inflation and output from respective targets.  Tay- 
lor  (1993) points  out that this  "rule"  need  not  be  a  mechanical  formula, 
but something which can be operated "informally", with recognition of  the 
"general instrument responses which underlie the policy rule".  Not surpris- 
ingly, the specification of  this rule, which reflect the underlying objectives of 
monetary policy, has been the subject of  considerable controversy.' 
In a closed-economy setting, Christiano and Guest (2000), for example, 
argue that only the inflation variable should appear as a target.  Rotemberg 
and Woodford  (1998) concur, but they argue that a higher average rate of 
inflation is required for monetary policy to do its job over the medium to  long 
term.  They base their argument on the zero lower bound for the nominal 
interest rate, since at very low inflation rates there is  little room for  this 
instrument to man~euvre.~ 
In an open economy setting, McCallum (2000) takes issue with the Rotem- 
berg and Woodford "policy ineffectiveness" argument under low inflation and 
zero  "lower  bounds"  for nominal interest rates.  McCallum argues that the 
central bank always  has  at its disposal  a  second  tool, the exchange rate, 
so if  the economy is stuck at a very low interest rate,  there is  the option 
of currency intervention. Christiano (2000) disagrees:  McCallumls argument 
'Recent  technical  papers on all aspects of  the Taylor  rule may be found on  the web 
page, http://ww.sta1~ford.edu/~johntayl/PolRulLink.htm#Technical%2Oarticles 
2Erceg, He~ldersorl  and Levin (2000) argued that output deviations should also appear 
in the Taylor rule, but the output measure should be deviations of  actual output from the 
level of output generated by a flexible-price economy. rests on the assumption that currency depreciation is effective.  Furthermore, 
the Central Bank must be willing to undermine public  "co~~fidence"  that it 
stands ready to cut interest rates in the event of major adverse shocks. 
For small emerging market economies, Taylor (2000) contends that policy 
rules  that focus  on a  "smoothed  inflation measure  and real  output"  and 
which do not  "try to react too much"  to the exchange rate might work well. 
However, he leaves open the question of  a role for the exchange rate.  Ball 
(1999) argues that inflation targeting "can be dangerous" in an open economy 
setting because exchange rate changes have a direct effect on inflation via 
changes in  import  prices.  Hence,  adoption of  a strict  inflation  targeting 
stance can result in large output variations. 
However, practically  all of  these ,studies are based  on linear stochastic 
and dynamic general equilibrium representations, or linearized  approxima- 
tions of  nonlinear models.  The Taylor-type feedback rules are either imposed 
or derived by linear quadratic optimization. While these approaches may be 
valid if  the shocks impinging on the economy are indeed "small"  and "sytn- 
metric"  deviations  from a steady state, they  may  be inappropriate  if the 
shocks are large, persistent,  and asymmetric, as they are in  many  highly 
open economies. 
Furthermore,  few if  any of  these studes incorporate  "learning"  on the 
part of  the monetary  authority itself.  Bullard  and Metra (2001) incorpo- 
rate private sector "learning" of  the specific Taylor rules used by  the central 
bank in the Rotemberg-Woodford closed economy framework.  They argue 
for Taylor rules based on eqectations of  current inflation and output devia- 
tions from target levels, rather than rules based on lagged values or Forecasts 
further into the future. 
In contrast to Bullard and Metra (2001), we assume that the private sec- 
tor uses  the true, stochastic dynamic, nonlinear model for formulating its 
own "laws of motion" for consumption, investment, and trade, with forward- 
looking rational expectations. In this analysis, the monetary policy authority 
learns the "laws of  motion"  of  inflation dynamics from past data, through 
continuously-updated least squares regression.  From the results of  these re- 
gressions, the monetary authority obtains an optimal interest rate feedback 
rule based  on linear quadratic optimization, using  weights  in the objective 
function for inflation which can vary with current conditions. The monetary 
authority is thus "boundedly rational",  in the sense of Sargent (1999))  with 
"rational" describing the use of  least squares, and "bounded"  meaning model 
rnisspecification. 
Our results show that if  the central bank decides to incorporate, in ad- 
dition to inflation, growth and exchange rate dynamics in its learning and 
policy objectives, it does so at high welfare costs. In a learning environment, there is  always the risk that the "perceived" laws of  motion lag behind the 
actual laws of  motion.  Hence expanding the range of  policy objectives may 
increase overall volatility and reduce welfare. For this reason, targeting only 
inflation dominates monetary policy based on multiple targets. 
The next section describes the theoretical structure of  the model for the 
private sector and the nature of  the monetary  authority  "learning".  The 
third section discusses the calibration as well as the solution method, while 
the fourth section analyzes the simulatiorl results of  the model.  The last 
section concludes. 
The Model 
2.1  Consumption 
The objective function for the private sector "representative agent" is given 
by the following utility function: 
where C  is the aggregate consumption index and y is the coefficient of relative 
risk  aversion.  Unless otherwise specified, upper case variables  denote the 
levels of  the variables while lower case letters denote logarithms of  the same 
variables. The exception is the interest rate denoted as 2. 
The representative agent as "household/firm"  optimizes the following in- 
tertemporal welfare function, with an endogenous discount factor: 
where ,f3  approximates the elasticity of  the endogenous discount factor ~9~+1 
with respect to the average consumption index, ct.  Endogenous discounting 
is  due to Uzawa  (1968) and Mendoza  (2000) states that  "endogenous  dis- 
counting"  is needed  for the model t.o produce well-behaved dynamics with 
deterministic stationary equilibria." 
The specification used in this paper is due to Schrnitt-Grohk and Uribe 
(2001). In our model, an individual agent's discount, factor does not depend 
on their own consumption, but rather their discount factor depends on the 
JEndogenous discounting also allows  the model to support equilibria in ivhich credit 
frictions may remain binding. 
4 average level of  consumption.  Schrnitt-Groh6 and Uribe  (2001) argue that 
this simplification reduces the equilibrium conditions by one Euler equation 
and one state variable, over the standard rnodel wit.h endogenous discount- 
ing, it greatly facilitates the computation of  the equilibrium dynamics, while 
delivering  "virtually  identical"  predictions of  key macroeconomic  variables 
as the standard endogenous-discounting model.'  In equilibrium, of  course, 
the individual consumption index  and the average consumption index are 
identical.  Hence, 
Ct = ct  (4) 
The corisumption  index is a composite index of non-tradeable goods N 
and tradeable goods T : 
c  = [(cN)"'  (CT)l-"'I / [(a;')  (1 -  ~1)~-=']  (5) 
where CY  is the proportion of  non-traded goods. 
Given the aggregate consumption expenditure constraint, 
PC  = pNcN  + pTcT 
and the definition of  the real exchange rate, 
the following expressions give the demand for traded and non-traded goods 
as functions of  aggregate expenditure and the real exchange rate 2: 
while the domestic price index may be written as the geometric average of 
non-traded  artd non-traded goods: 
Similarly, consumption of  traded goods is  a composite index of  export 
goods, X,  and import goods F: 
"Schniitt-Grohe and Uribe (2001) argue that if  the reason for i~ltroducing  endogenous 
discounting is solely for introducing stationarity,  "computatioilal  convenience" should be 
the decisive factor for  modifying the standard Uzawa-type model.  Kim and Kose (2001) 
reached similar conclusions. where a:! is  the proportion of  imported goods.  The aggregate expenditure 
constraint for tradeable goods is  given by the following expression: 
where E is the nominal exchange rate, and Px  is  the ratio of  foreign export 
prices to foreign import prices, the terms of  trade index (with Pm  = 1) 
The demand for export and import goods are functions of  the aggregate 
consumption of traded goods as well as the terms of  trade index: 
Similarly the price of  traded goods may be expressed as a geometric av- 
erage of  the price of  imported and export goods: 
2.2  Production 
Production of exports and imports is by the Cobb-Douglas technology: 
where E",  ~f  represent productivity shocks for export and import-producing 
firms, while (1  -a,), (1  -aJ)  are the capital coefficients, and A", Af the t.otal 
factor productivity effects, 
Total capital is simply the sum of  capital in each sector. Hence: 
The production  of  non-traded  goods is  given  by  the interaction of  an 
exogenous productivity shock with a fixed productive resource,  : 2.3  Aggregate Budget Constraint 
The combined household/firm faces the following budget constraint, in terms 
of  domestic purchasing power: 
The aggregate resource constraint shows that the firms producing trade- 
able goods face quadratic adjustment costs when they accumulate capital, 
with these costs given by  the term $  -  ~t]'  . For  both firms, capital 
depreciates at a fixed rate 6. 
Firms and households can borrow internationally  and accumulate inter- 
national debt L* at the fixed rate i*, but face a cost of borrowing in domestic 
currency which includes not only the expected rate of depreciation, (tel+l  -el) 
but also a time-varying risk premium Bt, less expected inflation. The variable 
e is  the logarithm of  the nominal exchange rate E, and tet+l the expected 
logarithmic rate at time t. 
The evolution of  currency risk Qt depends on the time-varying volatility 
of  the rate of  depreciation, here proxied by  the absolute value of  the lagged 
annualized rate of  depreciation,as well as on its own lag: 
The higher the volatility of  the rate of  depreciation, the higher the level of 
the risk premium demanded by international lenders. Hence I,  > 0. 
The consolidated household/firm  may also lend to the domestic govern- 
ment and accumulate bonds B which pay the nominal interest rate i. 2.4  Euler Equations 
The consolidated household and firm solves the following intertemporal wel- 
fare optimization problem by  choosing  the path of  "controls"  (vt}, repre- 
senting consumption  , aggregate capital {Kt+l),  capital in the import- 
{&+I}  : 
competing industries  )  , foreign borrowing {L;+,), and government bonds 
subject to the budget constraint, given in equation (20), as well as the fol- 
lowing inequality restrictions: 
The first order conditions are given by the following equations, represent- 
ing the derivatives of constrained intertemporal optimization with respect to 
Kt+1, q+1,  Bt+l, L;+,: 
The first Euler equation is the familiar condition that the marginal utility 
of  wealth is equal to the marginal utility of  income. The second equation relates to the marginal productivity of  capital. Cap- 
ital should be accumulated until the gross marginal productivity of  capital, 
adjusted  for  depreciation and transactions costs is  equal  to the marginal 
utility of  consumption today divided by  the discounted marginal utility to- 
morrow. 
The third equation sirrlply states that the marginal utility of capital in 
each sector should be equal. 
The last two equations tell us that the gross real returns on domestic or 
foreign assets should also be equal to the marginal  utility of  consumption 
today divided by the discounted marginal utility tomorrow. 
The first equation may be combined with the fourth equation to solve for 
current consumption as a function of  next period's expected marginal utility: 
The last two equations may be combined to give the interest arbitrage 
condition: 
Both current consumption and the logarithm of  the exchange rate depend 
on their expected future values. 
The solution of  the investment equation for aggregate  capital  and for 
capital in the two sectors takes place by equating the marginal productivity 
with the real returns of  either domestic or foreign assets: 
1  +  T+~)[  + (Kt  -  Kt)] = y  [(l  -  az)Axc;+,(Kt+l  -  KI+,)-~=]  + 
To solve for the capital stock, one first solves for Kf+, as a function of  the 
real interest rate and the expected aggregate capital stocks, Kt+1  and Kt+2, 
used to compute the costs of  adjustment: 
(1  + ~t+l)[l  + ($Kt+, -  Kt)]  -  (1 -  6)  -  cp [Kt+2 -  Kt+,] 
EP?+  1 
--j5-(1  -  Q,)A~E?+~ 
(35) 
Aggregate investment is the change in the total capital stock: 
Investment in the capital stock talces place with imported goods, F. 2.5  Macroeconomic Identities and Market Clearing Con- 
ditions 
From the above equations,  the trade balance,  TB, expressed  in  domestic 
currency, is simply net exports less net imports, inclusive of  goods used for 
investment : 
E PX  E 
TBt = -[Q;  -  Xt] -  p[~J  -  AKt -  Ft]  P  (37) 
while the current account  balance, CAB,  is  simply the trade balance plus 
interest on international debt: 
Under flexible exchange rates, net capital inflows are simply the mirror image 
of  the current account: 
E  E 
,Lkl  = FL;  -  CAB, 
While the exchange rate is determined  by  the forward-looking interest 
parity relation, and the terms of  trade are determined exogenously, the price 
of  non-traded goods adjusts in response to demand and supply in this sector. 
To capture more realistic  conditions of  "sticky  prices"  in  this sector, this 
model assumes that the price of non-tradeables follows a partial adjustment 
process to conditions of  excess demand or supply: 
where .C1/  represents the degree of  price stickiness. 
2.6  The Consolidated Government Sector 
2.6.1  Fiscal Authority 
The government is  bound by the following budget constraint: 
For simplicity, it is  assumed that the government deficit  D is  usually zero. 
However, the fiscal authority will  exact  lump sum taxes from  non-traded 
goods sector in order to run a surplus and "buy back domestic debt if it 
grows above a critical domestic debt/gdp ratio or threshold,  g.  Similarly, 
if  the external debt grows above a critical external debt/gdp ratio, 5,  the fiscal authority will levy taxes in the traded-goods sector in order to reduce 
or buy-back external debt. 
With these assumptions about fiscal policy the usual no-Ponzi game ap- 
plies to the evolution of  real government debt: 
1im Bt exp 
-(a-n)t  -  - 0 
t4oo  (42) 
2.6.2  Monetary Authority 
The monetary authority does not know the "correct" model for the evolution 
of  inflation.  We  assume three different policy scenarios. In the pure inflation 
target case, the monetary  authority estimates the evolutioi of  inflation as 
a function of  its own  lag as well  as of  changes in the interest rate.  In the 
inflationlgrowth scenario, the central bank estimates the evolution of  ida- 
tion and growth as functions of  their own lags and of  changes in the interest 
rate. Finally, in the inflation/growth/depreciation scenario, the central bank 
estimates the evolution of  all three as functions of  their own lags as well  as 
of  changes in the interest rate.  "Least squares learning"  is used to forecast 
the future values of  these "state"  variables in each scenario. 
QJ~  = rlt~t-l  +  rztAit  (44) 
where !Pt = (T~]  in the first scenario, Qt =.  [ rt,  Ayt] in the second scenario, 
and !€ft  = [rt  Ayt Ae,] in the third scenario. 
Corresponding to each scenario, the government optimizes the following 
loss function A, 
A,  =I  Xlt(7rt -  7~")~  (45) 
A2  =  Xlt(-irt -  T*)~  +  Xat(Ayt -  Q)2  (46) 
A3  =  Xlt(~t  -  T")' + Xat(Ayt -  Q)2  + ht(Aet -  x)'  (47) 
where T*, $, and x represent the targets for the inflation, output growth and 
depreciation rates under alternative policy scenarios. 
At time t,  depending on the scenario, the monetary authority specifies the 
weights on the loss function, At =  (Alt, Azt, A3t),  and estimates the state-space 
system. From the parameter set P,,  the policy maker sets the systematic part 
of  the interest rate as an optimal feedback function of the state variables Qt : where h(Pt,  At) is the solution of  the optimal linear quadratic  "regulator" 
problem, with control variable Ai solved as a feedback response to the state 
variables, and ct is a random, non-systematic component of  the interest rate 
at time t. 
In formulating its optimal interest-rate feedback rule, the government acts 
as time t as if  its estimated model for the evolution of  inflation and output 
growth is true "forever", and that its relative weights for inflation, or growth 
or depreciation in the loss function are permanently fixed. 
However,  as  Sargent  (1999) points  out in  a similar  model,  the mone- 
tary authority's own procedure for re-estimation "falsifies"  this pretense as 
it updates the coefficients {rlt,  I'2t},  and solves the linear quadratic regu- 
lator problem for a new  optimal response "rule"  of  the interest rate to the 
evolution of  the state variables Ik,. 
The weights for inflation, output growth, and depreciation in the respec- 
tive loss functions A,  depend on the conditions at time t. 
In the pure anti-inflation scenario, if  inflation is below the target level T* 
then the government does not optimize,  The interest rate it = it-l.  This is 
the "no intervention" case.  However, if  inflation is above the target rate, the 
monetary authority puts greater weight on inflation. In this case, Alt =  0.9. 
Table I illustrates this scenario. 
1 Table I: Policy ~ei~hts) 
I  T < 0.02  1  do nothing 
I  1 
In the second scenario, if inflation is below the target level T* and output 
growth is  positive,  then the government does not  optimize. If  inflation is 
above the target  rate, with  positive growth, the monetary  authority puts 
greater weight  on inflation than on output growth.  In this case, Xlt = 0.9. 
If growth is  negative but  inflation  is  above its target, the inflation weight 
dominates but somewhat,  more weight is given to output.  Finally, if  inflation 
is  below  its target  but  output growth is  negative,  the central  bank  puts 
strong weight on the output target.  The weights for this policy scenario are 
summarized in Table 11. In the third scenario, targets for the depreciation rate are also taken into 
account for formulating the policy feedback rule.  The relative weights are 
summarized in Table 111. 
1  Table 111: Policy Weights 
3  Calibration and Solution 
The sectian discusses the calibration of  parameters, initial conditions, and 
stochastic processes for the exogenous variables of  the model as well as the 
specification of the policy rules and risk premia "reaction function".  Then it 
briefly discuses parameterized expectations algorithm (PEA) for solving the 
model. 3.1  Parameters and Initial Conditions 
The parameter settings for the model appear in Table IV. 
Table IV: Parameters 
Consumption  y = 3.5,  /? =  0.009 
01  = 0.5,  02  =  0.5, 
Production  af  =  0.7,  a, = 0.5 
S=O.l,  #1=0.028 
Af  -0.1881,  Ax=0.3115,  A"=1.0 
Price Coefficient  0  = 0.7 
Debt Thresholds  = 0.5,  6 =  0.5 
Many of  the parameter  selections follow  Mendoza (1995, 2001).  The 
constant  relative  risk  aversion is  set  at 3.5,  somewhat  below  the value of 
5 usually set for  developing countries.  The shares of  non-traded  goods in 
overall consumption is set at 05, while the shares of  exports and imports 
in traded goods consumption is 50 percent  each.  The production function 
coefficients Qf and Qx, along with the initial values of  capital for each sector, 
are chosen to ensure that the marginal  product of  capital in each sector is 
equal to the real interest  plus  depreciation, while the level  of  production 
meets demand in each sector, In particular the values for af  and a, reflect 
the assumption that the production of  commodity exports is more capital 
intensive than manufactured imports. 
The initial values of  the variables appear in Table V. 
Table V:  Initial Conditions 
Consumption  C =  2.02,  N = 1.01,  X = F = 0.505 
Production  &f  = Qx = 0.505,  Q" = 1.01 
Capital  Kf = 4.33,  Kx  =  7.21 
Prices  E=pn2Z=1 
Interest Rates  i =  0.04 
Debt  B = L* = 0.404 
The initial value of consumption is given by the steady-state value implied 
by the interest rate and the endogenous discount factor. The values of  F, X, 
and N are then calculated on the basis of  the preference parameters in the 
sub-utility functions.  Similarly, the initial values of  production  are chosen 
on the basis of the initial steady state values. Since the focus of  the study is on the effects of  timovarying currency risk 
and terms of  trade shocks, the domestic productivity coefEcient,s as well  as 
the foreign interest rate were fixed at unity through the simulations.  Table 
VI gives the values of  these fixed variables. 
Table VI: Fixed Values 
Foreign Interest rate  i* =  0.04 
Productivity shocks  E"  =  6"  =  ~f = 1 
3.2  Terms of Trade and Currency Risk 
The evolution of  the terms of  trade is specified to mimic the data generating 
processes estimated for several countries, namely that the variable is an I(1) 
process: 
The parameter values for the evolution of  currency risk appear in Table 
VTI. 
Table VII: Currency Risk Parameters 
Constant  lo  = 0.0 
Lag  = 0.5 
Change in Exchange Rate  (,  = 1.0 
Variance of  Shock  cr:  -  0.0 
These are set to sharpen the focus on the feedback effects of  changes in 
the exchange rate on risk.  Thus! there is no  long-run  constant  "currency 
risk"  and no other source of  risk, except  changes in the exchange rate, so 
that, to  = 0 and 0;  = 0. 
3.3  Solution Algorithm 
Following WIarcet  (1988,  1993), Den  Haan  and Marcet  (1990,  1994), and 
Duffy and I~IcNelis  (20011, the approach of  this study is to "parameterize" 
the forward-looking  expectations in this model, with non-linear  functional 
forms +E, qc: where tct  represents a vector of  observable variables at time t: consumption 
of imported and export goods, F and X,  the marginal utility of  consumption 
X ,  the real interest rate r,  and the real exchange rate, 2, 
while Rx,  flE  represent the parameters for the expectation function. 
Judd (1996)  classifies  this  approach as a  "projection"  or  a  "weighted 
residual"  method for solving functional equations, and notes that the ap- 
proach was originally developed by Williams and Wright (1982, 1984, 1991). 
These authors pointed  out that the conditional  expectation of  the future 
grain price is a  "smooth function"  of  the current state of  the market, and 
that this conditional expectation can be used to chara.cterize equilibrium. 
The function forms for  q!!E, gC  are usually second-order  polynomial ex- 
pansiorls [see, for example, Den Haan and Marcet  (1994)l.  However, Duffy 
and McNelis (2001) have shown that neural networks have produced results 
with greater accuracy for the same number of  parameters, or equal accuracy 
with few parameters, than the second-order polynomial approximation. 
The model  was  simulated for  repeated  parameter  values  for  {Qx,  QE} 
until convergence was obtained for the expectational errors. A description of 
the solution algorithm appears in the appendix. 
4  Simulation Results 
To evaluate the effects of  the alternative policy scenarios, 500 simulations of 
sample length 200 quarters were generated. Table VIII shows the means and 
standard deviations of the volatility of inflation, output growth, depreciation, 
and the change in the interest rate. 
Wlat is  most  startling about Table VIII is  that incorporating growth 
as a target actually increases the volatility of  growth, over the case of pure 
inflation targeting.  Furthermore, incorporating exchange rate depreciation 
as a target, actually increases the volatility of  inflation. Not surprisingly, the 
volatility of  interest-rate changes increase as more targets are incorporated 
into the policy objectives and learning mechanism. Table VIII: Volatility Measures for Alternative Poiicy Scenarios 
Volatility of  Exchange Rate 
The Epanechnikov kernel estimators for the distribution of  inflation under 
the three policy scenarios appears in Figure 1. The Figure shows the reduc- 
tion in mean (and spread) of  volatility as the central bank changes its targets 
from the narrow pure inflation scenario to the broader inflation/growth  sce- 
nario.  However, incorporating depreciation increases the mean and spread 
of inflation volatility. 
Depreciations (  Ae) 
Volatility of  Interest Rate Changes (Ai) 
Figure 1:  Kernel Estimates for Inflation 












0.0020 Figure 2 shows the distribution of  the volatility estimates for economic 
growth under the three policy scenarios. Incorporating the additional growth 
target, or the additional growth and depreciation targets, markedly increase 
the expected volatility of  growth. 
Figure 2:  Kernel Estimates for GDP Growth 
Under Alternative Policy Scenarios 
Figure 3 shows that the distribution of  the welfare index is significantly 
higher under pure a inflation targeting scenario than under a growth-inflation 
or growth-inflation-depreciation  targeting framework. 
Figure 3:  Kernel Esti1nat.e~  for Welfare  - 
Under Alternative Policy Scenarios 5  Conclusions 
This paper has compared three alternative policy scenarios for a central bank 
facing terms of  trade shocks  and time-varying  currency  risk.  Urilike  the 
private sector, the central bank has to learn the laws of  motion for its key 
target variables in order to set the interest rate according to a feedback rule. 
The results show  that including growth or both growth  and exchange 
rate changes in its learning and policy targeting framework will significantly 
increase output variability with the possibility of only small reductions in in- 
flation variability.  Adopting such a framework will unambiguously reduce 
welfare.  The policy  implication  is  that central banks  which  are  already 
targeting inflation, should resist  pressures to adopt growth or growth  and 
exchange-rate targets. 
Of  course, the results of  this paper may be conditioned by  several key 
assumptions.  One is the learning mechanism.  Central banks  may indeed 
have  more s~phsticat~ed  knowledge of  underlying  idation dynamics than 
that which  is  implied  by  linear  least  squares learning.  Eiowever,  linear 
least  squares learning  is  a  good  "tracking"  mechanism  for  more  complex 
dynamic processes and our recursive method serves as an approximation to 
the Kalman filtering method for updating and learning. 
The other strong assumption of  this paper is  the evolution of  currency 
risk.  This variable  may well  be  conditioned by  changes in public  internal 
debt and, external debt as well as inflation and exchange rate changes.  How 
robust our policy results are to the way in which currency risk evolves is an 
open question. But assuming that currency risk first and foremost responds 
to past changes in the exchange rate is  a sensible first approximation, and 
would  bias  the case,  if  at all,  in  favor  of  exchange rate targeting for  the 
central bank. References 
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Int  ertemporal Lagrangean Represent at  ion 
Below is the equivalent Lagrangean expression of the intertemporal opti- 
mization problem of  the representative household-firm: 
E  E 
Z;L;+l -  --L;[l  +  2;  + (tet+l -  et) +  8, -  ?rt] -  P 
P 
--deft  -  Bt+l + Bt(l  + it -  rt)  -  ct) +  P 
Solution Algorithm 
The  solution algorithm for parameterized expectations makes use of neural 
network specification for  the expectations, and a genetic algorithm for the 
iterative solution method, as well as the quasi-Newton method. 
The specification of  the functional forms $"(xt; QE) and $"(xt;  a,) ac- 
cording to the neural network approximation, is done in the following way: 
J ' where J* is the number of exogenous or input variables, K* is the number of 
neurons, nrt  is a linear combinatiori of  the input variables, Nt is a logsigmoid 
or logistic transformation of  nt, and 4,  is  the neural network prediction  at 
time t for either (et+l)  or  ~X~[-V(C~)]A~+~  - (1 + it+1 -  T}. 
As seen in this equation, the only difference from ordinary non-linear esti- 
mation relating "regressors" to a "regressand" is the use of  the hidden nodes 
or  neurons, N.  One forms a neuron by taking a linear combination of  the 
regressors and then transforming this variable by  the logistic or logsigmoid 
function.  One then proceeds to thus one or more of  these neurons in a linear 
way to forecast the dependent variable q,. 
Judd (1996) notes that the neural networks provide us with an "inherently 
nonlinear  functional form"  for approximation, in  contrast  with  methods 
based on linear combinations of  polynomial and trigonometric functions. 
Both Judd (1996) and Sargent (1997) have drawn attention to the work 
of  Barron (1993), who found that neural networks do a better job  of "ap 
proximating"  any non-linear function than polynomials, in that sense that 
a neural network achieves the same degree of  in-sample predictive accuracy 
with fewer parameters, or achieves greater accuracy, using the same number 
of  parameters.  For this reason, Judd  (1996) concedes that neural networks 
may be particularly efficient at "multidimensional approximation". 
The main choices that one has to make for a neural network is  J*, the 
number of  regression variables, and K*,  the number of  hidden neurons, for 
predicting a given variable  y5t.  Generally, a neural network  with only one 
hidden neuron closely approximates  a simple linear  model,  whereas larger 
numbers of  neurons approximate more complex non-linear relationships.  Ob- 
viously, with a large number of  "regressors"  x and with a large number  of 
neurons N, one approximates progressively more complex non-linear  phe- 
nomena, with an increasingly larger parameter set, 
The approach of  this study is to use relatively simple neural networks, 
between two and four neurons, in order to show that even relatively simple 
neural network specifications do well for approximating non-linear relations 
implied by forward-looking stochastic general equilibrium models. 
Since the parameterized expectation solution is a relatively complex non- 
linear function, the optimization problem is solved with a repeated hybrid 
approach.  First a global search method, genetic algorithm, similar to the one 
developed by DufTy and McNelis (2001), is used to find the initial parameter 
set, then a local optimization, the BFGS method, based on the quasi-Newton 
algorithm, is used to ''fine tune" the genetic algorithm solution. 
De Falco (1998) applied the genetic algorithm to nonlinear neural network 
estimation, and found that his results "proved the effectiveness" of  such al- 
gorithms for neural network estimation. The main drawback of  the genetic algorithm is that it is slow.  For even a reasonable size or dimension of  the 
coefficient vector, the various combinations and permutations of  the coeffi- 
cients which the genetic search may find  "optimal"  or close to optimal, at 
various generations, may become very large. This is another example of  the 
well-known  "curse of dimensionality"  in non-linear optimization.  Thus, one 
needs to let the genetic algorithm "run" over a large number of generations-- 
perhaps several hundred-in  order to arrive at results which resemble unique 
and global minimum points. 
Quagliarella and Vicini (1998) point out that hybridization may lead to 
better solutions than those obtainable using the two methods individually. 
They argue that it is not necessary to carry out the quasi-Newton optimiza- 
tion until convergence, if one is going to repeat the process several times. The 
utility of  the quasi-Newton BFGS algorithm is its ability to improve the "in- 
dividuals it treats", so "its beneficial effects can be obtained just performing 
a few iterations each time"  [Quagliarella and Vicini (1998): 3071. NO.  AUTHORIS 
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